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Abstract
Based on a structural model of fertility and female labour force supply with
unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence, we evaluate the 2007 reform of
parental leave benefits in Germany, which replaced a flat, means-tested benefit
by a generous earnings-related transfer. The model predicts a short-term fertility
effect of about 4%, which is consistent with recent quasi-experimental evidence.
The fertility effect is strongest for first births and increases with income. We use
the model for a number of counterfactual policy experiments in which we vary the
generosity of parental leave benefits.
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1 Introduction
Almost all OECD countries have a system of paid parental leave in place. During parental
leave, parents are guaranteed their pre-birth jobs and typically receive some kind of
financial support. Countries differ in the duration of parental leave and the level and
design of benefit payments (Thévenon and Solaz, 2013).
In 2007, Germany, which had long been a classic example of a “male breadwinner” model,
took many observers by surprise and reformed its parental leave regulations to bring them
closer to the “Nordic model”. By shortening the entitlement period from 24 to 12 months
(14 months if both parents go on parental leave for at least two months), the reform set
clear incentives for a faster return to work. Moreover, the reform replaced the previous flat
and means-tested transfer of 300 euros with a benefit that depends on previous earnings
and can reach up to 1800 euros per month. The changes were introduced against a
background of low fertility (especially among women with a tertiary education) and weak
labour market attachment of mothers.
Several recent studies have evaluated the reform using quasi-experimental designs. Berge-
mann and Riphahn (2011a;b), Wrohlich et al. (2012), Kluve and Tamm (2013) and Kluve
and Schmitz (2014) show that the reform has had the intended effect of speeding up moth-
ers’ return to employment.1 The evidence concerning the fertility effects is more mixed.
Raute (2014) finds that the new earnings-related parental leave benefit has increased
fertility, especially for women in the middle and in the upper end of the income and edu-
cation distributions. Bujard and Passet (2013) find that the probability of a second birth
was not significantly different in the periods 2003–2006 and 2007–2008, while Cygan-
Rehm (2013) finds no evidence that the probability of another birth within 36 months
has changed because of the reform; however, she does find evidence that the timing of
1Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) find that earlier reforms that increased the duration of parental leave
reduced mothers’ employment in the short run, with small longer-run effects. Dustmann and Schönberg
(2012) show that the expansions had little effect on child outcomes in the long run.
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births within the 36-months window has been affected.2
The quasi-experimental studies face the challenge that the reform in parental leave ben-
efits was not the only change in family policy in Germany in recent years. Beginning
in 2004, a major effort has been made to increase the availability of public childcare for
children below the age of three. Starting from a low level, the number of places has been
increased, and since August 1st, 2013, all children older than 12 months are entitled to
subsidized public childcare. The increase affected different regions and different groups of
the population differently, and may thus contaminate the difference-in-differences strate-
gies used to evaluate the 2007 reform of parental leave benefits.
The main contribution of the present paper is to estimate a structural model that allows
isolating the effects of the new parental leave benefits scheme from the effects of other
developments during the same time. A structural approach also has the advantage that
the effects of different components of the reform can be disentangled, and that the model
can be used to simulate counterfactual policy experiments.
Our model builds on the work of Haan and Wrohlich (2011). In each period, women
choose among three employment states (non-employment, part-time, full-time) and decide
whether to have a child or not. The labour supply of the partner is assumed to be
exogenous, which given observed employment patterns is a reasonable approximation.
The model allows for state dependence and takes into account unobserved heterogeneity
in fertility preferences, which is modelled through a latent class approach. Disposable
incomes at each choice alternative are simulated using a detailed representation of the
tax-transfer system. The model is estimated using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) for the years 2005–2010. Mainly due to the reform in parental leave benefits
in 2007, there has been substantial variation in fertility and labour supply incentives
during this period, both over time and across households.
2Tamm (2013) and Neugart and Ohlsson (2013) show that some women tried to shift the timing of
births around the day the reform took effect. See Cygan-Rehm (2014) for a survey on the fertility effects
of the 2007 reform.
2
We complement the standard SOEP data set with information from the recent extension
“Familien in Deutschland” (FiD, “Families in Germany”) that has direct information on
whether parents are rationed in their access to public childcare. The new data allow us
to obtain a more realistic picture of childcare costs and hence disposable income at each
choice alternative.
We use the estimated parameters to predict fertility and female labour supply outcomes
under both the actual tax-transfer system of 2012 and several counterfactual changes to it.
In addition to evaluating parental leave benefits and public childcare subsidies, we study
the fertility and female labour supply effects of child benefits and income tax splitting,
two other important family-related policies. Public spending on the four measures in
Germany totals around 70 billion euros per year (BMFSFJ, 2008).
We find that the 2007 reform in parental leave benefits has a positive effect on fertility. If
the rules had still been those of the pre-reform period, the number of births in 2012 would
have been lower by about 24 000, which corresponds to 4% of actual births in that year.
The effect is strongest for first births and is driven by women from the third and fourth
quartiles of the income distribution, many of whom were not eligible for the means-tested
pre-2007 benefits and receive substantial transfers under the new regime. Both the size of
the overall effect and the heterogeneous response pattern are consistent with the recent
quasi-experimental study by Raute (2014).
As for the other measures, child benefits increase the fertility rate but have a small
effect on female labour supply. In contrast, income tax splitting reduces work incentives
for the secondary earner without any significant effect on the number of births. In our
simulations, subsidized public childcare is found to increase female labour supply at the
expense of fertility. However, the negative fertility effect is driven by the one-year horizon
of the model.
Finally, we use the structural model for a series of policy experiments in which we vary
the generosity of parental leave benefits. The model predicts that doubling the level of
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benefits would have led to 150 000 additional births in 2012, roughly a quarter of actual
births in that year. Note, however, that the one-year horizon of the model does not allow
distinguishing between timing effects and effects on completed fertility, so this increase
is most likely an upper bound. The increase in the number of births is found to be
associated with fiscal costs of about 17.5 billion euros per year. The number takes into
account both direct spending on parental leave benefits and the reactions of income tax
revenue, social security contributions, as well as the interactions with other transfers.
Of course, given that the simulation is for a level of benefits much higher than what we
observe in the data, the prediction can only indicate a rough order of magnitude.
As noted, the paper closest to ours is by Haan and Wrohlich (2011). They estimate a
structural model for fertility and female labour supply for the years 2000–2006, i.e. the
period before the reform of parental leave benefits. Laroque and Salanié (2013) estimate
a similar model for France. Wrohlich et al. (2012) estimate a structural labour supply
model and use it to evaluate the new German parental leave benefits scheme. They focus
on women’s return to work, however, and do not endogenize the fertility decision. Lalive
et al. (2014) develop a job search model to study how the design of parental leave in
Austria (both benefits and duration) affects mothers’ return to work. To our knowledge,
ours is the first structural model that analyzes the effects of parental leave benefits on
both female labour supply and fertility.
Bick (2013) and Domeij and Klein (2013) estimate life-cycle models of female labour sup-
ply and fertility using data for Germany. They use the models to simulate the effects of
changes in childcare subsidies. Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2011) additionally endog-
enize the occupation choice. They run a counterfactual policy experiment in which they
double the amount of child benefits. Fehr and Ujhelyiova (2012) calibrate an overlapping
generations model to the German economy of 2007/2008. They simulate stylized reforms
in child benefits and several changes to the taxation of family income.3
3In addition to these structural models, there is also a number of recent quasi-experimental papers
on the fertility effects of family policy measures: Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) study how two reforms in
the duration of the Austrian parental leave scheme affected mothers’ return to work and (higher-order)
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, explains the
simulation of disposable incomes and illustrates the fertility and employment incentives
generated by the tax-transfer system. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 doc-
uments the estimated parameters, the fit of the model and results from an out-of-sample
validation. Section 5 reports findings from a series of counterfactual policy experiments
in which we compare the pre- and post-2007 rules of the parental leave benefits, vary the
level of generosity of the current system, and switch off selected family policy measures
while keeping the rest of the tax-transfer-system in place. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Fertility and labour supply decisions
We model only cohabiting couples (regardless of marital status), as our data set shows
that very few women live alone in the year the child is born. We adopt a unitary frame-
work, i.e. couples maximize a joint utility function.
Households are indexed by i and consider in each period t (taken to be a year) whether
to have a child; they also choose the employment status of the woman (not employed,
part-time, full-time). There are thus J = 6 mutually exclusive options to choose from.
We have to be careful when defining how the employment status enters the choice set.
In Germany, women are not allowed to work in the first eight weeks after childbirth, and
very few women work while the child is younger than one year, which means that there
is little variation that our model could explain. The employment status for women who
give birth in year t is therefore measured 12 months after birth. For the women who do
fertility. Milligan (2005) and Azmat and González (2010) investigate the fertility effects of income tax
reforms, while Brewer et al. (2012) studies an increase in per-child welfare spending and González (2013)
analyzes the effects of the introduction of a universal child benefit in Spain. Cohen et al. (2013) show
that fertility rates in Israel have been responsive to various changes in the tax-transfer-system that affect
the costs of a child.
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not give birth, the employment status is measured in March.4
The utility of option j for household i in period t is given by Uijt = Vijt+εijt. Vijt is the
component of utility that is observed by the econometrician (up to a parameter vector
β); we assume the following, linear-in-parameters specification:
Vijt = βyi yijt+βyLyijtLjt+βLi Ljt+βLLL2jt+βFi Fjt+βFLFjtLjt+βFyFjtyijt (1)
where yijt is the natural logarithm of (monthly) disposable household income, Fjt ∈ {0,1}
indicates whether a child is born, and Ljt is female non-market time. We assume that
the theoretical maximum of market work per week is 80 hours (five days per week times a
maximum of 16 hours per day). We assign 20 hours/week to part-time employment, and
40 hours/week to full-time employment. The corresponding non-market time is therefore
60 and 40 hours per week, respectively. For women who are not employed, non-market
time is 80 hours per week. We multiply these numbers by the average number of weeks
per month, as we define Ljt on a monthly basis.
We account for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. The observed
characteristics included in the model are the number of existing children, the age of both
partners, their education, marital status, immigration background, residence in East
Germany, working as a civil servant, size of the house or apartment, self-reported concerns
about the household’s financial situation, and self-reported health concerns. They enter
the utility function through interactions with disposable income, non-market time and
the fertility indicator.
To capture state dependence, preferences also depend on the employment and fertility
choices of the previous period (Li,t−1,Fi,t−1). Following Wooldridge (2005), we deal with
the initial conditions problem by conditioning on employment and fertility in the first
observation period for each household.
4Alternatively, we measure employment at the month of the interview for the women who do not give
birth. Since the employment status of women who do not give birth varies little over the year, this does
not matter much for the results.
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Unobserved heterogeneity is captured through a random coefficient on the fertility vari-
able. We allow forM discrete types in the population, and estimate their shares pim along
with the other parameters of the model. This random coefficient framework is equivalent
to an error components model with a time-invariant individual-specific component. We
assume that the remaining error component is independently and identically extreme-
value distributed. The model is flexible enough to allow for correlations both across time
and across alternatives and avoids the restrictive substitution patterns implied by the
standard logit model.
The probability that a household i of type m makes a sequence of choices (kt)t=1,...,Ti
(where Ti is the number of choice situations observed for household i) is given by
Li(βm) =
Ti∏
t=1
[
exp(x′ikttβm)∑J
r=1 exp(x′irtβm)
]
(2)
As we do not observe a household’s type, its log-likelihood contribution is the log of the
weighted sum of these probabilities over all types:
LLi = ln
 M∑
m=1
pim
Ti∏
t=1
[
exp(x′ikttβm)∑J
r=1 exp(x′irtβm)
] (3)
The sample log-likelihood is the sum of these LLi over the N households in our sample.
2.2 Simulation of disposable income
To estimate the parameters of the utility function, disposable household income yijt must
be known (or rather simulated) not just for the choice the households actually made, but
also for all other potential choices. The simulation takes into account income taxation
and the most important transfers, including welfare benefits, housing benefits, parental
leave benefits and child benefits. Both taxes and transfers depend on gross earnings and
income from other sources (such as capital income or rental income) as well as other
household characteristics such as marital status or the presence of children.
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Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the simulation of disposable income for an example
household (married couple, one child aged 12 months; monthly cost for rent and heating:
393 euros).5 The horizontal axis shows the gross earnings of the male partner, the vertical
axis measures monthly disposable household income. By assumption, the woman in the
example household is not employed. The figure illustrates that the decision not to be
employed corresponds to a different disposable income depending on the earnings of the
male partner. The same holds for the two other options not shown in the figure, i.e. part-
time and full-time work. Even for the example household shown here (for whom all other
characteristics except for male earnings are held constant), disposable income in the non-
employment state varies between 1800 and about 3500 euros per months in a given year
post-2007. In the actual estimation, there is additional variation as the women observed
in the data have different gross hourly wages and household characteristics.6 The figure
also illustrates that there is substantial variation across time, which is mainly driven by
the 2007 reform of parental leave benefits.
Figure A.2 illustrates how the presence of a child can influence disposable income. We
vary weekly hours of work of the female spouse along the horizontal axis. The vertical
axis shows the difference in disposable income between a couple with a child aged twelve
months and a couple without a child, for otherwise identical household characteristics.7
The figure shows that especially since the reform of parental leave benefits in 2007,
(female) hours of work and the presence of a child aged twelve months strongly interact
in the determination of disposable income. If the woman works less than 30 hours per
5The value for rent and heating is relevant for calculating social assistance and housing benefits. The
value assumed here corresponds to the average value among recipients of social assistance in July 2011
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Durchschnittliche Höhe der Zahlungsansprüche für Leistungen für Unterkunft
und Heizung nach Größe der Bedarfsgemeinschaft).
6For women who do not work and for whom we do not observe earnings, we impute wage offers based
on a model that accounts for selection into employment (Heckman, 1979). The results are documented
in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix.
7The example household is a married couple in which the male partner is assumed work 40 hours per
week, for an hourly gross wage of 16 euros. We follow Haan and Wrohlich (2011) and assume that the
hourly wage of the woman is 12.40 euros. Her monthly net earnings in the previous year (relevant for
the calculation of parental leave benefits) are set to 2000 euros. Costs for rent and heating are assumed
to be 334 euros (no child) and 393 euros (one child) per month.
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week, the household is entitled to parental leave benefits, which can be a substantial
amount. Prior to 2007, the amount was much lower and, due to the means testing, was
hardly relevant for many households.
Additional incentive effects arise from the temporal and regional variation in the cost and
availability of childcare — public childcare has long been in short supply in Germany, in
particular for children aged below 3. This variation in (expected) childcare costs is not
included in the two previous figures, but does enter the simulated disposable incomes used
in the estimation of the model. We assume that the amount of external childcare required
is a function of parents’ employment status. More precisely, we make it dependent on
min{hm,hf}, where h are weekly hours of work and m and f index the male and female
partner. If the minimum is 0, no external childcare is needed. If the minimum is 20 or
40 hours, parents need to organize the corresponding amount of childcare for all children
up to the age of 6. Assuming a fixed relationship between parental working hours and
childcare reduces the number of choice variables in the model, and provides a reasonable
approximation to observed patterns of childcare use.
For each household, we compute expected childcare costs in each choice alternative. With
a certain probability, the household is “rationed”, i.e., cannot find a subsidized childcare
slot. Based on data from the 2010 SOEP extension “Familien in Deutschland” (FiD,
“Families in Germany”), which has detailed information on childcare use and costs, par-
ents are defined to be rationed if they answer that they do not send their child to public
childcare because they could not get a place, because the distance was too great or be-
cause the opening hours do not correspond to their needs. We estimate the rationing
probability as a function of the region and the age of the child, and then impute the
probabilities to the SOEP households. As Table A.1 in the Appendix shows, the proba-
bility of not finding an adequate slot in public childcare is higher in West Germany and
for younger children. Following Müller et al. (2013), we assume that parents who cannot
find a subsidized childcare slot have to rely on privately organized childcare, at a rate of
6.40 euros per hour.
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Parents who do have access to public childcare pay a (heavily subsidized) monthly fee,
which depends on household income, the age of the child, the region, whether siblings are
already in childcare, and whether the child is in part-time or full-time care. Note that
for some parents (e.g., with low income or in specific regions), parental fees can be zero.
Estimation results (from Tobit models) are shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
3 Data
The model is estimated using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The SOEP,
which started in 1984, is a longitudinal survey of private households, with a rich set of
information on personal and household characteristics.8
We use the SOEP waves 2004–2011 to study choices in the years 2005–2010. The last wave
cannot be used because monthly information on the employment status is only available
retrospectively for the previous year. The first wave is used to construct previous net
earnings (relevant for the simulation of parental leave benefits) when modelling the choice
in 2005. As the SOEP is available for all years since 1984, we could in principle go further
back in time. However, we choose to focus on the period after the major labour market
reforms of 2005, which in our view is the relevant environment for counterfactual policy
experiments that are informative for today’s economic policy.
We restrict the sample to women aged 23–45 who live with a partner and who are neither
in education nor self-employed. We focus on fertility and labour supply decisions of
couples because in our data very few children are born to women who do not live with a
partner. Our sample includes both married and unmarried couples.
Applying these criteria (and after listwise deletion of missing values), we are left with
8 329 household-year observations for 2 641 households. The sample is an unbalanced
panel. There are 464 households with information for six consecutive choice situations,
8See Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description.
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while 614 households are modelled in only one choice situation (but are observed in three
adjacent years, see above). Table A.3 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for the
sample. As explained above, we impute expected childcare costs for each household at
each choice alternative. We predict that full-time care for a child below the age of 3 will
on average cost 311 euros per month for the households in our sample. Full-time care for
older children will cost 152 euros per month. For part-time care, the average costs are
196 and 100 euros, respectively. As noted above, the costs differ by region, household
income, and number of siblings.
Table A.6 in the Appendix documents that a woman’s employment status is highly de-
pendent on whether she gave birth in the previous year. In this case, only 6% of women
in our sample work full time, while for women who did not give birth twelve months ago
the share is 33%. Women in West Germany and women who have other children tend to
work less often twelve months after childbirth. For men, the employment status is only
weakly related to the birth of a child (Table A.7). Twelve months after a child is born,
81% of men in East Germany and 87% of men in West Germany work full time. This
suggests that treating male labour supply as exogenous is a reasonable approximation.9
4 Estimation Results
Full estimation results are documented in Table A.8 in the Appendix. The first column
shows results from a multinomial logit model without unobserved heterogeneity, while the
second column reports the estimates from a latent-class model with two discrete mass
points for the fertility coefficient.
We will not discuss the long list of parameter estimates here, which are hard to interpret
9Note that the table refers to the entire estimation period 2005–2010. We find evidence that after
2007, fathers’ labour supply tends to react more strongly to the birth of a child, which is in line with the
incentives set by the two extra “daddy months” that are part of the post-2007 rules for parental leave
benefits. Using data from the German Microcensus, Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2012) show direct evidence
that use of parental leave by fathers has increased in Germany.
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individually given the non-linear model and the many interactions between the variables.
We therefore choose to focus on model fit and on out-of-sample validation for assessing
the model.
The only individual parameter estimates that do merit discussion are the results concern-
ing the unobserved heterogeneity in fertility preferences. The difference in the fertility
coefficient between the two groups is estimated to be 2.08. The (transformed) share pa-
rameter is estimated to be -0.4215, which corresponds to a share of 39.6%. However, the
share parameter is not statistically significant.
We also tried models with three and four mass points, but found that the share parameters
were equally insignificant. Moreover, based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),
these models perform less well than the model with two mass points.10 In these models,
not only the share parameters but also many of the differences between the types turn
out to be statistically insignificant.
We conclude from this that after including a long list of observed characteristics in the
model, the iid assumption underlying the conditional logit model may be a reasonable
approximation. The results reported in the remainder of this paper are therefore based
on the conditional logit specification without unobserved heterogeneity. This has the
advantage that the simulations can be based on the analytical transition probabilities
derived by Bonin and Schneider (2006).
Table 1 shows that the model predicts the observed choices quite well. Part of this fit is
obtained simply by construction. The multinomial logit model has the property that it
equates the observed and predicted averages of all covariates. Since the model includes
an indicator variable for whether a child is born in a particular choice alternative, the
perfect fit that we observe here follows directly from the assumptions.11 Since the birth
10The values of the AIC are 10 946 (two mass points), 10 951 (three mass points), 10 954 (four mass
points). The conditional logit model has an AIC of 10 962.
11The birth rate is defined as the number of births divided by the number of women in the sample.
The value of 5.6% in our sample is close to the official figure of 3.7% reported by the Federal Statistical
Office for the year 2010. The latter figure uses all women aged 15–49 in the denominator, while we
restrict our sample to women aged 23–45 and living in couple households, which explains why we find a
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indicator is interacted with several other variables, we also find a perfect fit for the two
subgroups (East vs. West, other children yes/no) shown here.
Studying the fit for the participation rate is more meaningful as the model includes female
non-market hours at each choice alternative but not a dummy for participation. As a
consequence, the mean of the female hours variable is predicted by construction, but
the same is not true for the three individual working hours categories. We find that
the model predicts the participation rate quite well, both in the overall sample and for
different subgroups.12
Table 1: Model fit
Participation rate Birth rate
Data Model Data Model
East 79.8% 81.7% 5.9% 5.9%
West 70.9% 70.4% 5.6% 5.6%
Already has children 67.8% 66.6% 5.0% 5.0%
No other children 86.9% 90.3% 7.3% 7.3%
Total 72.9% 72.9% 5.6% 5.6%
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2005–2010. N=8329 for 2641 unique households. Birth
rate = number of births divided by the number of women aged 23–45.
Since we have several years of data for the estimation, we explore how the model’s predic-
tions perform out of sample. Results are reported in Table 2. The first row corresponds
to the last row of Table 1, i.e. it shows the fit of the model when the estimation and
the prediction sample coincide. In the other rows, we estimate the model only on a
subset of years and compare the predictions of the model with the actual observations
for later years. As expected, these out-of-sample predictions are less exact than the
within-sample fit. However, predicted and observed values are still reasonably close. As
expected, we find in most cases that the longer the estimation period compared to the
prediction period, the better the predictions. Since our actual simulations are be based
slightly higher birth rate.
12The predicted joint distribution of the participation and birth indicators is also very close to the
distribution observed in the sample. For the joint distribution of the hours variable and the birth
indicator, the correspondence is again exact by construction as the model includes the interaction of
both variables.
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on the entire estimation period from 2005–2010 and will make predictions for a single
year (2012), the most informative row of Table 2 is the last one, where observations and
predictions are particularly close. Moreover, the simulations are based on a comparison
between the baseline simulation for 2012 and different counterfactual policy experiments
in which certain policy measures in the 2012 tax-transfer system will be switched off.
By a difference-in-differences argument, this means that not exactly predicting the lev-
els for 2012 will not be a problem as long as the prediction error stays constant in the
counterfactual scenarios.
Table 2: Out-of-sample validation
Participation rate Birth rate
Estimation Prediction
period period Data Model Data Model
2005–2010 2005–2010 72.9% 72.9% 5.6% 5.6%
2005–2006 2007–2010 74.8% 69.1% 5.7% 11.1%
2005–2007 2008–2010 75.9% 73.9% 5.9% 6.4%
2005–2008 2009–2010 76.5% 75.2% 6.6% 5.8%
2005–2009 2010 76.8% 76.2% 6.3% 5.5%
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2005–2010. N=8329 for 2641 unique households. Birth
rate = number of births divided by the number of women aged 23–45. Example: When we estimate
the model on data for 2005–2007 and use the parameters to predict fertility and female employment
in 2009–2010, we obtain predictions of 75.2% (participation rate) and 5.8% (birth rate). The observed
values for the 2009–2010 period are 76.5% and 6.6%, respectively.
5 Policy Experiments
5.1 Parental leave benefits
In 2007, Germany reformed its system of parental leave benefits. The previous means-
tested child-rearing benefit (Erziehungsgeld) was replaced by Elterngeld, which depends
on (individual) earnings in the year before childbirth. In most cases, the replacement rate
is 67%. The benefit is capped at 1800 euros per month, but nevertheless represents a
substantial transfer, especially compared to the previous child-rearing benefit. To receive
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the benefit, at least one of the parents has to reduce working hours below the threshold
of 30 hours per week. The benefit is paid for twelve months. If both partners reduce their
working time, the benefit can be extended to 14 months. We neglect this possibility here
as we assume that the labour supply of the male partner is exogenous.
We simulate a policy experiment in which we replace the actual parental leave benefits
(Elterngeld) in the 2012 tax-transfer system by the pre-2007 Erziehungsgeld rules. We
assume the variant of the Erziehungsgeld in which households receive a maximum of
300 euros for up to 24 months. Alternatively, households could receive 450 euros during
12 months only, but this variant was less popular.13 Recall that our model captures the
incentives twelve months after birth, so we abstract from the difference in entitlement
duration and focus on the effect of the level of benefits and their design (replacement of
individual net earnings versus strict means testing at the household level).
We keep the remaining rules of the 2012 tax-transfer-system in place. The simulation
takes the interactions within the system into account. Accordingly, a change in the level
of parental leave benefits does not lead to a one-to-one change in disposable income as
other transfers (e.g., social assistance) or income tax payments will be affected by the
change.
Table 3 reports main results from the simulation. We find that a return to the pre-2007
rules of parental leave benefits would have reduced the number of births in 2012 by about
24 000. With about 650 000 births in Germany in 2012, this corresponds to around 4%
of actual births. The difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
The order of magnitude of the effect is quite close to the quasi-experimental study by
Raute (2014). Based on Vital Statistics, she documents an increase in birth rates of 4%
nine months after the reform was passed. Moreover, in difference-in-differences and IV
estimates based on administrative pension data she finds that for a difference of 1000 euros
in total benefits, the probability to give birth is higher by 1.2% in each of the three years
13In 2003, for instance, 88% of parents chose to receive parental leave benefits for 24 months (cf.
Fendrich et al., 2005).
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Table 3: Main results: 2007 vs. 2012 rules of parental leave benefits
Employment
Fertility Participation rate Full-time equivalents
(in 1000 births) (in 1000)
Total -23.9* (14.3) 0.48 (0.39) 16.5 (12.1)
By household income
1st quartile 0.2 (0.5) 0.02 (0.03) 0.4** (0.2)
2nd quartile -1.2 (1.4) 0.08 (0.11) 1.2 (1.0)
3rd quartile -6.5*** (2.2) 0.17 (0.16) 1.9 (1.3)
4th quartile -16.4 (13.7) 1.79 (1.69) 12.9 (11.9)
By number of children
Without children -17.1 (14.0) 1.70 (1.62) 14.1 (12.0)
One child -4.1** (1.8) 0.19 (0.15) 1.7* (0.9)
Two children -2.2 (2.1) 0.06 (0.11) 0.7 (1.1)
More than two children -0.6 (0.9) -0.02 (0.10) 0.0 (0.2)
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2009–2011. N=1059 households. The table shows results
from a counterfactual policy experiment in which the 2012 rules of the parental leave benefits (Eltern-
geld) are replaced by the pre-2007 rules (Erziehungsgeld). One full-time equivalent corresponds to
40 hours per week. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 runs) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
after the 2007 reform. As she reports average pre-reform payments in 2006 of about 4 000
euros and average post-reform benefits of about 7 000 euros, her main estimate is very
similar to the prediction from our structural model.
As can be expected, the reduction in the number of births goes hand in hand with
an increase in female labour supply. The model predicts that by returning to the pre-
2007 rules, the labour supply of women would have been higher by about 17 000 full-
time equivalents, where one full-time equivalent corresponds to 40 hours per week. The
participation rate would have been higher by 0.48. To put this into perspective, the
female labour force participation rate in our estimation period 2005–2010 is 73% (cf.
Table A.3 in the Appendix). The effects on female labour supply are not statistically
significant at conventional levels, however.
As the simulations are based on micro data, we can go beyond the average response and
study the reactions for different subgroups. Table 3 shows that the fertility reaction is
mainly driven by households in the two highest quartiles of the income distribution. This
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also holds when the change is not measured in absolute numbers as in the table, but as a
percentage change in the status quo birth rates. Note, however, that only the change for
the 3rd quartile is statistically significant. Finding the strongest negative fertility reaction
among households with high income is in line with the incentives set by the reform: while
the current benefit replaces individual earnings, the pre-2007 system was flat and means-
tested. A hypothetical return to this system should then reduce fertility incentives for
high-income women, and the model predicts that the difference in the number of births
in 2012 is about 6 500 for the third and about 16 400 for the fourth quartile.14
The table also shows that the strongest fertility effect occurs at the extensive margin.
The model predicts that a return to the pre-2007 system would reduce first births in 2012
by about 17 000, while the reaction for second or higher-order births is much smaller.15
Again, the pattern holds not only for the absolute changes reported in the table, but
also for birth rates, i.e. for the changes divided by the baseline number of births in 2012.
That the strongest reaction occurs at the extensive margin is quite plausible: women who
do not have any children tend to work full-time, so for them the difference between the
flat, means-tested benefit pre-2007 and the new earnings-dependent benefits scheme is
greatest.16 Note, however, that in our relatively small simulation sample of about 1 000
households, only one of the four coefficients is statistically significant at conventional
14The finding that the effect is strongest for the upper half of the income distribution is consistent
with the quasi-experimental study by Raute (2014). She finds some evidence that although the new
parental leave benefit increases continuously with pre-birth earnings, the fertility effect appears to reach
a plateau at a net income of about 13 500 euros per year. The present structural model does not capture
this kink (unless one is willing to accept the lack of statistical significance in the fourth quartile as
evidence consistent with it). Note, however, that the income measures are not directly comparable:
while Raute (2014) measures individual net earnings, the present paper distinguishes the quartiles based
on disposable household income.
15Note that we classify couples by the number of children at the beginning of each choice situation.
So the reduction in the number of births for childless couples refers to the 17 000 (first) births that
took place in the baseline scenario but, according to our simulations, would not have occurred in the
counterfactual scenario.
16In her quasi-experimental study, Raute (2014) also finds that the 2007 reform of parental leave
benefits most strongly affected the probability of a first birth. Likewise, Bujard and Passet (2013) and
Cygan-Rehm (2013) do not find that the reform had a strong impact on higher-order births, although
Cygan-Rehm does find some evidence of an effect on the timing of higher-order births (within a time
window of 36 months after the previous birth).
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levels.17
5.2 Alternative specifications
As noted in Section 2, we follow Haan and Wrohlich (2011) and measure female labour
supply twelve months post partum if a woman gave birth, and in March otherwise.
When we measure labour supply nine or fifteen months after birth instead, the fertility
effects are hardly changed: the simulations predict reductions of 25 000 and 28 000 births,
respectively, instead of the -23 900 births in our main specification. For the labour supply
reactions the difference is larger, especially at the extensive margin. When labour supply
is measured nine or fiveteen months after birth, a return to the pre-2007 parental leave
benefits is predicted to increase the participation rate of women in couples by 0.12 and
0.08 percentage points, while the corresponding value is 0.48 percentage points in our
main specification. However, these results are still within the 95% confidence interval of
the main estimate.
The main specification compares the current system of parental leave benefits with the
pre-2007 rules. We assume that under the pre-2007 rules households would be entitled
to a flat benefit of 300 euros per month, which was the amount that households could
receive for up to 24 months. There was also a shorter variant in which households received
450 euros for twelve months. When we assume this monthly amount in the comparison,
the difference between the pre-2007 and the current benefit amounts becomes smaller.
Accordingly, we find a reduction of only about 13 000 births in 2012, as opposed to
the 24 000 in our main specification. The labour supply reactions are also smaller: the
participation rate is predicted to increase by 0.28 percentage points, while total labour
supply is higher by 12 000 full-time equivalents.
Finally, our simulations predict that completely abolishing parental leave benefits would
17The same holds for the labour supply reactions. In terms of the point estimates, these are the mirror
images of the fertility effects. The subgroups with the strongest negative fertility reactions show the
strongest positive labour supply effects.
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have reduced births by 46 000 in 2012.
5.3 Comparison with other family policy measures
Table 4 shows results for other important family policy measures.18 Each row of the table
is from a separate experiment in which we switch off the indicated measure and keep the
remaining rules of the 2012 tax-transfer-system in place.
In 2012, child benefits in Germany amounted to 184 euros per month for the first two
children, 190 euros for the third child and 215 euros for additional children. Alternatively,
households can deduct a tax allowance of 7008 euros per child from their annual taxable
income. Child benefits and child tax allowance last for up to 25 years (and even longer
in a few exceptional cases that we neglect here, such as when the child is handicapped).
The simulations predict that without these measures, there would have been 21 000 fewer
births in 2012. The difference is statistically significant and corresponds to about 3% of
all births actually observed in 2012. Women are predicted to work more, but the effects on
the participation rate and the number of full-time equivalents are not significant. Given
that child benefits are close to a lump-sum transfer and therefore affect employment
mainly through an income effect, finding small labour supply reactions is not surprising.
For income tax splitting, the mechanisms are opposite: while the measure is not directly
related to the number of children a couple has, the splitting formula equalizes marginal
tax rates of both spouses and therefore has an adverse effect on the labour supply of
the secondary earner (typically the woman).19 The model predicts that by moving to
18We have also simulated the labour supply and fertility effects of a number of smaller family policy
measures (tax credit for single parents, tax deduction of childcare costs, reduced contribution rate for
long-term care insurance for persons with children, child benefits supplement (Kinderzuschlag), child-
related components of social assistance (ALG II ) and housing benefits, advance payment child alimony
(Unterhaltsvorschuss)), but found their fertility effects to be close to zero.
19In Germany, married couples can file a joint declaration. Income tax T is calculated as T =
2t(YM+YF2 ), where YM and YF is taxable income of the spouses, and t is the income tax function.
As the income tax system is progressive, the couple as a whole benefits financially. However, for the
partner with the lower taxable income (typically the woman), the measure can create strong disincentives
to take up employment beyond the threshold of 400 euros per month; below this threshold, earnings are
exempt from income tax and employee’s social security contributions.
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Table 4: Results for other family policy measures
Employment
Fertility Participation rate Full-time equivalents
(in 1000 births) (in 1000)
Child benefits -21*** (10) 0.13 (0.25) 5 (7)
Income tax splitting -4 (14) 1.23*** (0.41) 37*** (12)
Subsidized childcare 38** (19) -4.23*** (0.85) -75*** (15)
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2009–2011. N=1059 households. The simulations are
based on the tax-transfer system of 2012. One full-time equivalent corresponds to 40 hours per week.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 runs) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
individual taxation, the number of births in 2012 would have been essentially unchanged,
while the participation rate of women in couples would have been higher by 1.23 percent-
age points. Including also the reactions at the intensive margin, the total labour supply
effect corresponds to 37 000 full-time equivalents. Note that the table shows the effect
for all women in couples. Since some of the women are unmarried, income tax splitting
is not directly relevant for them. The effect reported here is therefore smaller than the
labour supply effect for married women. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the
model takes the hourly wage offers and the marital status in the choice situation as well
as the employment state in the previous period as given. Since these are influenced by
the effects of income tax splitting in previous periods, the long-run effect of the measure
will be somewhat higher.
Parental fees for public childcare are heavily subsidized in most countries. In Germany,
they cover only around 14% of actual costs (Schilling, 2008). We simulate a policy ex-
periment in which we assume that parents have to bear the full cost of public childcare
through their parental fees. Even more so perhaps than for the other three measures,
this is a radical departure from the status quo. The results—which rest on the assump-
tion that the parameters of the utility function, the hourly wage offers and the other
household and individual characteristics remain constant despite this massive change in
incentives—should therefore be interpreted carefully. Note also that we do not take gen-
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eral equilibrium effects into account. Among other things, this means that parents have
to pay higher fees, but do not benefit from any tax reductions.
As childcare becomes much more expensive, many mothers decide to work less and to
look after their children themselves. The model predicts that the increase in parental fees
for childcare to a level that covers full costs leads to a decrease in the participation rate
by 4.23 percentage points, and to 75 000 fewer full-time equivalents. Note again that this
is the reaction for all women aged 23–45 and living in a couple. This includes women
who currently do not have children. For women who already have children, the reaction
is stronger. The biggest absolute reduction in the participation rate (-7.15 percentage
points, not reported in the table) is found for women with two children. For women with
more than two children, participation goes down by 4.24 percentage points.
The reduction in female labour supply induced by the high childcare costs has a surprising
side effect in the model: some of the women who already have children below the age
of 6 and who withdraw from the labour market decide to have an additional child. The
mechanism at work here is that the opportunity cost of another child is in fact very low
now for women who are already mothers and who prefer to stay at home instead of paying
the prohibitively high cost of childcare for their older children. As a result, the model
predicts that in the counterfactual scenario in which childcare subsidies are abolished,
the number of births in 2012 would have been higher by 38 000. This effect is driven by
women with one previous child (16 000 additional births) or two previous children (plus
18 000 births). Women without any children are affected less as they are not hit by the
cost increase for older children. Women with more than two children are also less affected
as most of them work few hours already in the status quo.
However, we consider the positive fertility effects that result from making childcare more
expensive to be an artifact of the myopic model. In the model, women realize that the
increase in childcare costs actually lowers the opportunity cost of another child in the first
year after birth, where external childcare is empirically not relevant in Germany anyway.
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In contrast, the model assumes that women do not anticipate that the opportunity cost
for the additional child will eventually be much higher now that external childcare has
become prohibitively expensive for many women.
5.4 Variation in the level of parental leave benefits
Our simulations predict that abolishing parental leave benefits would have reduced births
by 46 000 in 2012, while switching off child benefits would have led to a reduction of 21 000
births. Replacing income tax splitting by individual taxation has almost no effect on fer-
tility, and making parents pay the true cost of public childcare through parental fees
is predicted to actually increase fertility. When relating these effects to the fiscal cost,
parental leave benefits come out as the clear winner in terms of fiscal efficiency.20 How-
ever, this comparison is to be taken with a grain of salt as our short-run model is ill-suited
for an evaluation of measures that last for a long time (child benefits, income tax split-
ting) or that set in beyond the one-year horizon assumed in the model (childcare). We
therefore refrain from simulations in which we reduce spending on one measure while in-
creasing spending on another measure—such budget-neutral reforms would be interesting
from a public policy standpoint, but should be carried out in a more elaborate (life-cycle)
model that does better justice to all four family policy measures.
In the present paper, we therefore focus on a single measure. We use our structural
model for a series of hypothetical reforms to the current system of parental leave benefits
in which we simulate the entitlements according to the status quo rules of 2012 and
then multiply them by a factor ranging from 0 to 2, with a stepsize of 0.1. At one
extreme, parental leave benefits are thus abolished; at the other extreme, the entitlement
is doubled. Note that this includes a doubling of the upper limit of 1 800 euros per month,
20Spending on child benefits and child tax allowance amounts to more than 30 billion euros, and income
tax splitting costs slightly more than 20 billion euros. In 2008, the precise values were 33.4 and 20.7
billion euros, respectively (BMFSFJ, 2008). Spending on parental leave benefits was 4.6 billion euros in
2010 (BMAS, 2010), while public childcare subsidies totalled 11.1 billion euros (Schilling, 2008). While
the values for 2012 may differ slightly, the orders of magnitude and the ranking stay the same.
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Figure 1: Fiscal costs of varying the number of births through the generosity
of parental leave benefits
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Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2009–2011. N=1059 households. The simulations are based
on the tax-transfer system of 2012. The label next to the marker symbols shows the factor by which the
status quo level of parental leave benefits is scaled in a particular scenario.
so the maximum monthly amount is now 3 600 euros.
What increase in the number of births can be achieved through the additional fiscal
spending? Figure 1 traces out the menu from which, according to the simulations, policy
makers can choose. The model predicts that if the level of parental leave benefits had
been doubled in 2012, there would have been about 170 000 additional births. With about
650 000 actual births in that year, this would have been a substantial increase of about a
quarter.
However, this increase would have come at a substantial cost. Direct spending on parental
leave benefits alone would have been higher by 14.8 billion euros (taking into account
the behavioural adjustments). For comparison, actual spending in 2010 was about 4.6
23
billion euros (BMAS, 2010). The total fiscal cost would have been even higher at about
17.5 billion euros. This number includes not only the direct spending on parental leave
benefits, but also the additional effects that arise from the interactions with income tax
payments, social security contributions and transfer receipt. The main driving forces
are the increase in child benefits that results from the increase in fertility, as well as
a reduction in income tax payments and social security contributions. The latter is a
consequence of the reduction in female labour supply that is associated with the greater
number of births.21
If, on the other hand, parental leave benefits had been zero in 2012, there would have
been 46 000 fewer births (7% of actual births). Direct savings would have amounted to
3.0 billion euros.22 In contrast, net fiscal savings (i.e., taking into account interactions
within the system of taxes and transfers) would have been only around 1.7 billion euros
because for low-income households a cut in parental leave benefits is in some cases entirely
compensated by a rise in social assistance payments.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the effects of a number of family policy measures on fertility
and female labour supply. Despite the importance of the question there is still little
evidence on these effects. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) and
detailed information on childcare costs from a recent SOEP extension, we have estimated
a discrete choice model that takes both state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity
into account. The estimation exploits the substantial variation in incentives across time
and across households that was introduced by the 2007 reform of parental leave benefits
21While parental leave benefits are not directly taxable in Germany, they affect the tax rate that has
to be paid on the taxable income (Progressionsvorbehalt). As a result, a change in parental leave benefits
also affects income tax payments without any change in behaviour. This automatic effect is much smaller
than the effect due to the behavioural adjustment, however.
22The simulation model is based on a sample of households that fulfill certain criteria with respect to
the age of the woman and her employment status (cf. Section 3). As a result, simulated spending on
parental leave benefits is lower than the official figure of about 4.6 billion euros.
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in Germany.
We find that the reform increased the number of births in 2012 by about 4%, a number
which is very close to recent quasi-experimental evidence. Our simulations also suggest
that in relation to fiscal cost, parental leave benefits are more efficient in setting fertility
incentives than child benefits, which are less targeted towards the crucial period right
after childbirth.
In an additional set of policy experiments, we have varied the generosity of parental leave
benefits while keeping all other rules of the tax-transfer system in place. The model
predicts that by doubling the level of benefits, there could have been 150 000 additional
births in 2012, roughly a quarter of actual births in that year. This increase would have
cost about 17.5 billion euros according to the simulations. We show that it is important
to use a comprehensive measure of fiscal costs, which takes into account the reactions of
income tax revenue, social security contributions and the interactions with other transfers.
All results should be considered as approximative, however, as the model abstracts from
a number of considerations that might turn out to be important. First and foremost, the
model assumes that households make their decisions based exclusively on the incentives
one year ahead. This myopic model underestimates the effect of measures that only
become relevant after age 1 (subsidized childcare) or that last for a long period of time
(child benefits, income tax splitting). We expect that a dynamic programming model
with forward-looking behaviour would lead to a more plausible ranking of the measures
with respect to effect strength. Importantly, a life-cycle model would also allow making
the crucial distinction between effects on completed fertility and mere timing effects. For
instance, it is quite likely that the 150 000 additional births in 2012 that are predicted
to result from making parental leave benefits twice as generous reflect to a large extent
pure timing effects.
A second shortcoming of the present model is its partial equilibrium nature. Some of the
counterfactual policy experiments that we conducted have substantial fiscal implications,
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and it would be interesting to study to what extent the results still hold when imposing
a government budget constraint or allowing for general equilibrium effects on the labour
market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Simulation of childcare costs and disposable income
Figure A.1: Disposable household income by earnings of the male partner
Source: Own calculations. Married couple, one child aged 12 months. Costs for rent and heating:
393 euros per month. The woman is assumed to be not employed. Her earnings in the previous year
(relevant for the calculation of parental leave benefits) are set to 2000 euros per month.
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Figure A.2: Disposable household income, couples with and without children
Source: Own calculations. Two married couples, with one child (aged 12 months) and without child.
The vertical axis shows the difference in monthyl disposable income between the two households. Costs
for rent and heating: 334 euros (no child) and 393 euros (one child) per month. The woman’s earnings in
the previous year (relevant for the calculation of parental leave benefits) are set to 2000 euros per month.
The man is assumed to work 40 hours per week. The gross hourly wage is assumed to be 16 euros (man)
and 12.40 euros (woman).
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Table A.1: Probability of not having access to public childcare
Age 0-2 Age 3-6
East 10.2% 2.3%
West 15.8% 4.3%
Total 14.8% 4.0%
Source: Own calculations based on FiD 2010. Children aged 6 or below. N=4517. Households are
classified as not having access to public childcare if parents report that their child is not in public
childcare because they could not find a place, because the distance would be too great, or because
the opening hours do not correspond to their needs.
Table A.2: Parental fees for public childcare: estimation results
Part-time care Full-time care
Age < 3 56.2*** (14.1) 64.8*** (5.8)
Number of children in household -21.9*** (4.1) -28.4*** (4.4)
Net household income (1000 euros/month) 23.2*** (3.1) 17.0*** (3.8)
Single parent -23.6** (9.4) -32.0*** (10.5)
Intercept 39.7** (16.4) 149.1*** (24.3)
Dummies for federal state Yes Yes
Number of observations 972 906
Of which left-censored 222 171
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03
Source: Own calculations based on FiD 2010. Dependent variable: self-reported parental fees per
month. Results from Tobit models. Children aged 6 or below. Asymptotic standard errors (clustered
at the household level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2 Summary statistics
Table A.3: Summary statistics
House- Female Male
hold partner partner
Married 84% — —
East Germany 22% — —
No children 26% — —
One child 30% — —
Two children 33% — —
More than two children 11% — —
Youngest child aged 0-2 16% — —
Youngest child aged 3-6 27% — —
Youngest child aged > 6 58% — —
Not employed — 27% 6%
Part-time — 41% 3%
Full-time — 32% 87%
Other — — 3%
Wage offer — 11.2 16.9
Expected childcare costs: Part-time, Age 0–2 196e — —
Expected childcare costs: Full-time, Age 0–2 311e — —
Expected childcare costs: Part-time, Age 3–6 100e — —
Expected childcare costs: Full-time, Age 3–6 152e — —
Immigrant — 15% 15%
Son/daughter of immigrants — 5% 5%
No vocational training — 14% 11%
Secondary degree and/or vocational training — 67% 67%
Tertiary degree — 19% 22%
Civil servant — 5% 7%
Worried about financial situation — 24% 25%
Age — 37 40
— (SD: 5.7, Min: 23,
Max: 45)
(SD: 6.7, Min: 22,
Max: 71)
Satisfied with health — 7.2 7.1
— (SD: 1.9, Min: 0,
Max: 10)
(SD: 1.9, Min: 0,
Max: 10)
Number of observations 8329 8329 8329
Number of households 2641 2641 2641
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. SD: standard deviation. Min: minimum. Max:
maximum. See Section 2 for the construction of expected childcare costs.
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A.3 Additional tables and figures
Table A.4: Wage estimation — Women in West Germany
Log(hourly wage) Participation
Secondary degree and/or vocational training 0.16*** (0.010) 0.42*** (0.025)
Tertiary degree 0.50*** (0.013) 0.82*** (0.032)
Experience: full-time (years) 0.03*** (0.001) 0.05*** (0.003)
Experience: full-time (years) squared -0.0004*** (0.00003) -0.0002** (0.0001)
Experience: part-time (years) -0.003** (0.0015) 0.13*** (0.004)
Experience: part-time (years) squared 0.0002*** (0.00005) -0.003*** (0.0002)
Total years unemployed -0.05*** (0.002) —
Married -0.04*** (0.008) -0.48*** (0.023)
Civil servant 0.17*** (0.011) —
Foreign nationality -0.11*** (0.011) -0.18*** (0.030)
Number of children aged < 3 — -1.04*** (0.034)
Number of children aged between 3 and 6 — -0.15*** (0.021)
Number of children aged between 7 and 16 — -0.02** (0.012)
Person needing long-term care in household — -0.43*** (0.067)
Handicap — -0.54*** (0.049)
Capital income at household level (euros/month) — -0.0001** (0.00004)
Other revenues at household level (euros/months) — -0.001*** (0.0001)
Intercept 2.17*** (0.027) -0.23*** (0.060)
Rho 0.01 (0.05)
Sigma 0.39 (0.002)
Log-likelihood -21784.25
Number of observations 27 317
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. In addition to the variables shown here, the
models include year dummies and dummies for the federal state. Omitted reference category: left
school without a degree.
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Table A.5: Wage estimation — Women in East Germany
Log(hourly wage) Participation
Secondary degree and/or vocational training 0.001 (0.029) 0.78*** (0.067)
Tertiary degree 0.29*** (0.032) 1.45*** (0.075)
Experience: full-time (years) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.02*** (0.006)
Experience: full-time (years) squared -0.0003*** (0.00005) 0.0004** (0.00002)
Experience: part-time (years) -0.01*** (0.002) 0.10*** (0.008)
Experience: part-time (years) squared 0.0005*** (0.0001) -0.003*** (0.0004)
Total years unemployed -0.07*** (0.02) —
Married 0.06*** (0.011) -0.06* (0.038)
Civil servant 0.25*** (0.023) —
Number of children aged < 3 — -1.15*** (0.063)
Number of children aged between 3 and 6 — 0.04 (0.043)
Number of children aged between 7 and 16 — 0.05* (0.026)
Person needing long-term care in household — -0.61*** (0.114)
Handicap — -0.20** (0.093)
Capital income at household level (euros/month) — 0.001*** (0.0002)
Other revenues at household level (euros/months) — -0.002*** (0.0003)
Intercept 2.3*** (0.045) -0.75*** (0.106)
Rho -0.54 (0.05)
Sigma 0.40 (0.005)
Log-likelihood -6449.51
Number of observations 8 373
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. In addition to the variables shown here, the
models include year dummies and dummies for the federal state. Omitted reference category: left
school without a degree.
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Table A.6: Women — employment conditional on birth in previous year
No birth in previous year Birth in previous year
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time employed time time
East 17% 34% 49% 73% 14% 13%
West 26% 45% 28% 80% 16% 4%
Already has children 30% 51% 19% 83% 13% 5%
No other children 9% 19% 72% 69% 22% 9%
Total 24% 43% 33% 78% 16% 6%
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. N=8329 for 2641 unique households. Example:
Twelve months after giving birth, 13% of women in East Germany and 4% of women in West Germany
work full time.
Table A.7: Men — employment conditional on birth in previous year
No birth in previous year Birth in previous year
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time Other employed time time Other
East 9% 2% 84% 4% 13% 4% 81% 3%
West 5% 4% 88% 3% 6% 4% 87% 2%
Already has children 5% 4% 87% 4% 6% 6% 88% 1%
No other children 6% 3% 87% 4% 9% 5% 84% 2%
Total 6% 3% 87% 3% 8% 4% 86% 2%
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. N=8329 for 2641 unique households. Other:
education, military/civilian service, pensioners. Example: Twelve months after a child is born, 81%
of men in East Germany and 87% of men in West Germany work full time.
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Table A.8: Estimated utility parameters
Without random effects With random effects
LogC 8.11*** 8.45***
(3.09) (2.59)
Lf 6.03*** 6.08***
(0.35) (0.32)
Lf × Lf -0.55*** -0.55***
(0.01) (0.01)
Birth -1.76 -2.38
(2.13) (2.19)
LogC × one child -4.04*** -4.51***
(0.71) (0.74)
LogC × two children -3.15*** -3.71***
(0.83) (0.85)
LogC × three or more children -3.53*** -4.13***
(1.32) (1.35)
LogC × age (woman) ∈ [23,29] -1.41 -1.00
(1.18) (0.99)
LogC × age (woman) ∈ [30,34] -0.32 -0.01
(0.91) (0.43)
LogC × age (woman) ∈ [35,39] 1.01 1.24*
(0.78) (0.69)
LogC × age (man) (years/10) -1.12** -1.18**
(0.53) (0.46)
LogC × immigrant (woman) 1.25 1.28
(0.88) (0.89)
LogC × 2nd generation immigrant (woman) 1.67 1.78
(1.26) (1.23)
LogC × East Germany -0.98 -1.13*
(0.64) (0.65)
LogC × married 0.70 0.86
(0.75) (0.77)
LogC × neither secondary nor vocational degree (woman) 2.13** 2.33***
(1.04) (1.08)
LogC × neither secondary nor vocational degree (man) -1.85** -2.02***
(0.88) (0.90)
LogC × tertiary degree (woman) -0.38 -0.22
(0.67) (0.68)
LogC × tertiary degree (man) 0.86 1.04
(0.71) (0.72)
LogC × civil servant (woman) -3.78*** -4.12***
... continues on next page
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Table A.8: (continued)
Without random effects With random effects
(1.26) (1.27)
LogC × civil servant (man) 0.93 0.76
(1.18) (1.18)
LogC × worried about own financial situation (woman) 0.44 0.32
(0.62) (0.64)
LogC × size of flat or house (square metres/100) 1.47 1.66
(1.03) (1.05)
LogC × satisfied with health (woman) 0.95 1.09
(1.44) (0.88)
LogC × Lf -0.02 -0.02
(0.09) (0.09)
LogC × Birth -1.80 -2.23
(1.47) (1.61)
LogC × LogC 0.76 0.72
(0.52) (0.53)
LogC × LogC × LogC -0.08 -0.14
(0.50) (0.56)
LogC × Lf × LogC 0.03 0.08
(0.15) (0.16)
Lf × one child -0.34*** -0.38***
(0.07) (0.07)
Lf × two children -0.36*** -0.41***
(0.08) (0.08)
Lf × three or more children -0.26** -0.31***
(0.11) (0.11)
Lf × age (woman) ∈ [23,29] -3.00*** -3.02***
(0.34) (0.34)
Lf × age (woman) ∈ [30,34] -1.05*** -1.06***
(0.27) (0.25)
Lf × age (woman) ∈ [35,39] -0.13 -0.11
(0.23) (0.23)
Lf × age (man) (years/10) -0.14*** -0.15***
(0.05) (0.05)
Lf × immigrant (woman) 0.10 0.10
(0.08) (0.08)
Lf × 2nd generation immigrant (woman) -0.01 0.01
(0.11) (0.11)
Lf × East Germany -0.37*** -0.38***
(0.06) (0.06)
... continues on next page
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Table A.8: (continued)
Without random effects With random effects
Lf × married 0.19** 0.19**
(0.07) (0.08)
Lf × neither secondary nor vocational degree (woman) 0.24*** 0.26***
(0.08) (0.08)
Lf × neither secondary nor vocational degree (man) -0.03 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08)
Lf × tertiary degree (woman) -0.04 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
Lf × tertiary degree (man) 0.16** 0.17**
(0.06) (0.07)
Lf × civil servant (woman) -0.54*** -0.57***
(0.17) (0.17)
Lf × civil servant (man) 0.22** 0.20*
(0.11) (0.11)
Lf × worried about own financial situation (woman) 0.09 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Lf × size of flat or house (square metres/100) 0.13 0.14
(0.09) (0.10)
Lf × satisfied with health (woman) -0.02 -0.00
(0.13) (0.04)
Lf × Birth -2.09*** -2.20***
(0.54) (0.55)
Lf × Lf (previous year) 0.40*** 0.41***
(0.01) (0.01)
Lf × Birth (previous year) 0.25*** 0.24***
(0.06) (0.06)
Lf × Lf (initially observed) -0.93*** -0.93***
(0.03) (0.03)
Lf × Birth (initially observed) -0.57*** -0.58***
(0.06) (0.06)
Lf × Lf × age (woman) ∈ [23,29] 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.03) (0.03)
Lf × Lf × age (woman) ∈ [30,34] 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
Lf × Lf × age (woman) ∈ [35,39] 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Lf × Lf × Birth 0.27*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04)
Birth × one child 0.13 -0.05
... continues on next page
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Table A.8: (continued)
Without random effects With random effects
(0.22) (0.24)
Birth × two children -1.06*** -1.29***
(0.31) (0.34)
Birth × three or more children -0.42 -0.66
(0.38) (0.42)
Birth × age (woman) ∈ [23,29] 1.96*** 2.05***
(0.38) (0.39)
Birth × age (woman) ∈ [30,34] 1.94*** 2.11***
(0.31) (0.30)
Birth × age (woman) ∈ [35,39] 1.33*** 1.52***
(0.27) (0.28)
Birth × age (man) (years/10) -0.61*** -0.72***
(0.19) (0.20)
Birth × immigrant (woman) -0.44* -0.43
(0.26) (0.28)
Birth × 2nd generation immigrant (woman) -0.01 0.01
(0.34) (0.33)
Birth × East Germany 0.48** 0.52**
(0.20) (0.22)
Birth × married 0.77*** 0.92***
(0.24) (0.26)
Birth × neither secondary nor vocational degree (woman) -0.75** -0.91***
(0.29) (0.32)
Birth × neither secondary nor vocational degree (man) -0.03 -0.03
(0.28) (0.30)
Birth × tertiary degree (woman) 0.78*** 0.83***
(0.20) (0.23)
Birth × tertiary degree (man) 0.50** 0.56**
(0.20) (0.22)
Birth × civil servant (woman) -0.65 -1.02*
(0.48) (0.52)
Birth × civil servant (man) 0.42 0.46
(0.30) (0.33)
Birth × worried about own financial situation (woman) -0.32* -0.31
(0.19) (0.20)
Birth × size of flat or house (square metres/100) 0.91*** 1.06***
(0.30) (0.33)
Birth × satisfied with health (woman) 0.76* 0.74*
(0.44) (0.39)
... continues on next page
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Table A.8: (continued)
Without random effects With random effects
Birth × two children × children of same sex 0.56** 0.53*
(0.25) (0.28)
Birth × three or more children × children of same sex -0.50 -0.58
(0.53) (0.60)
Birth × Lf (previous year) -0.28*** -0.25***
(0.06) (0.06)
Birth × Birth (previous year) -3.04*** -3.47***
(0.30) (0.33)
Birth × Lf (initially observed) 1.42*** 1.42***
(0.11) (0.13)
Birth × Birth (initially observed) 3.16*** 3.79***
(0.17) (0.26)
Birth × mass point 1 2.08***
(0.30)
pi1 -0.42
(0.40)
Log-likelihood -5397.0 -5387.2
Observations 49974 49974
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2004–2011. Results from Maximum Likelihood estimation of
a conditional logit model (left column) and a latent-class conditional logit model with two mass points
on the Birth coefficient (right column). Lf = weekly leisure of the woman (hours/10). LogC = natural
logarithm of monthly disposable household income. Omitted reference categories: age ≥ 40; neither
immigrant nor 2nd generation immigrant; secondary degree or vocational training. Asymptotic standard
errors clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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